Introduction
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that although South Africa has permissive termination-of-pregnancy legislation to the extent that women can terminate first-and second-trimester pregnancies on demand and for socio-economic reasons, foetal interests 1 are in fact taken into account. The system of female reproductive rights progressively shelters foetal interests, albeit to a limited extent.
At common law, legal subjectivity starts at birth and requires that the child must be separate from the mother's body and must survive independently of the mother after separation. 2 Without any evidence of live birth, constitutional rights will not vest in the foetus. Accordingly, a tension arises between foetal interests in continued existence (as a non-legal subject) on the one hand, and women (as legal subjects) exercising their rights to autonomy by accessing termination-of-pregnancy services on the other. Within this framework, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1998 (hereafter the Choice Act) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) will be examined in order to determine whether the Choice Act is a legislative entrenchment of the tension that arises or whether it silently balances these opposing positions.
The Choice Act both advances and limits female reproductive rights. In the process of limiting reproductive rights, foetal interests in continued existence are brought to the fore and taken into account. Two main factors concerning the Choice Act will be considered. First, the Choice Act advances a number of constitutional rights relevant
The demand for substantive equality in the sphere of reproductive rights makes the connection between systemic discrimination against women and women's reproductive role.
11
O'Sullivan states that from a substantive perspective the right to equality requires the state to take positive intervening action and to provide the minimum resources Birenbaum 1996 SAJHR 488. 10 Birenbaum 1996 SAJHR 488. 11 O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-14 . The fact that s 9(3) embraces pregnancy, in addition to sex and gender, as a prohibited ground for discrimination acknowledges that women are members of a systematically disadvantaged group whose historical and current condition requires enhanced judicial consideration.
necessary for the enjoyment of certain rights. 12 For example, Ngwena points out that public hospitals are required to provide free termination-of-pregnancy services.
13
The Choice Act recognises that in order to achieve equality women must be able to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, since they are best placed to make this decision. 14 In the Preamble of the Choice Act specific reference is made to the recognition of the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, nonracialism, and non-sexism. The Choice Act allows for the termination of a pregnancy on request during the first twelve weeks of gestation, and from thirteen to twenty weeks for socio-economic reasons.
The right to dignity
The Constitution provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. and to act upon a decision concerning reproduction treats her as a means to an end and strips her of her dignity". In terms of being an individual as an end in herself, women should not be treated as mere instrumental objects of the will of others, and 12 O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-12. The right to equality provides women with the freedom to choose whether or not to have intercourse or to choose how many children to have and when, and permissive termination legislation is an issue of social justice and sexual equality. 13 Ngwena 2004 JL Med and Ethics 715. However, see Harries et al 2012 J Biosoc Sci 197; Harries et al 2009 BMC Public Health 296 . Each article demonstrates that although South Africa has this policy in place, the demand for termination-of-pregnancy services is rarely adequately met as a result of poor infrastructure, and a lack of physical space and personnel. The lack of personnel is linked to provider opposition to the termination of pregnancies and unwilling care providers. The shortage of termination-of-pregnancy providers undermines the availability of termination services. 14 O'Sullivan "Reproductive Rights" 37-14-37-15. respect" is primarily a negative obligation not to treat another merely as a means, but rather to recognise in the other person the ability to act as an autonomous moral agent. 24 This approach underwrites a conception of dignity as a formal entitlement to equal concern and equal respect. 25 As the right to dignity secures the space for selfactualisation, women are entitled to respect, since they hold the capacity to create meaning for themselves and pursue their own ends. 
The right to bodily and psychological integrity
In terms of section 12(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and the right to security in and control over their body. The specific recognition of reproductive freedom was probably intended to leave little room for the courts to prohibit the termination of pregnancies, and this section gives recognition to the fact that socially entrenched forms of physical oppression and exploitation relate to reproduction and sexuality. 27 According to O'Sullivan, section 12(2) directly confronts the fact that women do not enjoy security in and control over their own bodies, taking into account the high rates of sexual violence against 
The right to privacy
The constitutional right to privacy in terms of section 14 is the right to be "left alone"
and to exist free from state interference. 
Children's rights
Children's rights are also advanced by the Choice Act to the extent that even a female under the age of eighteen may terminate her pregnancy without having to obtain parental consent.
60
In Christian Lawyers 2005, the Choice Act came under constitutional scrutiny. Here the plaintiffs sought an order declaring sections 5(1), (2) and (3), read with the definition of "woman", to be unconstitutional and to be struck down. 61 The Choice Act defines a woman as any female of any age and, in terms of section 5(1), the termination of a pregnancy may take place only with the informed consent of the pregnant woman. In terms of section 5(2) and (3), no consent other than that of a pregnant woman is required for the termination of her pregnancy. In the case of a minor, it is required of the medical practitioner or midwife to advise the minor to consult with her parents, guardian, or a family member. Should the pregnant minor decide against consulting with such persons, the termination of her pregnancy cannot be denied on that ground. 28(1)(b); 28(1)(d); 28(2); 9(1); and 7(1).
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The High Court held that instead of using age as a measure of control the legislature had rather opted to use capacity to give informed consent 64 as the yardstick.
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Where capacity to give informed consent does not exist, despite the age of the woman, the termination of her pregnancy cannot be effected. 66 It was held that in the context of the Choice Act capacity to give informed consent is determined on a caseby-case basis by the medical practitioner, based on the emotional and intellectual maturity of the individual concerned rather than on an arbitrarily predetermined and inflexible age. 67 The approach adopted by the Choice Act prevents frustration of the minor's constitutional rights where she is emotionally and intellectually capable of giving informed consent for the termination of her pregnancy.
68
It was held that the rationale behind the requirement for informed consent in medical procedures brings the court very close to the founding principles from which the right to terminate a pregnancy in itself arises: an individual's fundamental right to selfdetermination. 69 The court found that the fundamental right to individual selfdetermination "lies at the very heart and base of the constitutional right" to terminate a pregnancy, and that sections 10, 12(2)(a) and (b), 14, and 27(1)(a) provide the foundation for the right to terminate a pregnancy. 70 Further, the court stated that the: 71 …commonality of the source of the right to termination of pregnancy with the ratio for informed consent, make informed consent not only a viable and desirable principle for the regulation of the right, but also the most appropriate.
64 Informed consent consists of three elements: knowledge, appreciation and consent. Knowledge requires a woman to be aware of the nature and extent of the risk, and appreciation requires a woman to understand the extent of the risk inherent in termination procedures (Christian Lawyers 2005 515D) . Consent means that a woman must subjectively consent to the risk, and her consent must be comprehensive to the extent that she consents to the entire transaction inclusive of all of its consequences (Christian However, it was found that the right to terminate a pregnancy, like all constitutional rights, is not absolute, and that the state has a legitimate role, in the protection of prenatal life as an important value in our society, to limit a woman's right to termination. 72 Since the right to terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental constitutional right, state regulation cannot amount to a denial of the freedom to exercise the right. Thus, the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom as required in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 73 Accordingly, the court found it unjustifiable to limit access to termination-of-pregnancy services on the grounds of age.
The court concluded that the Choice Act allows a woman with the capacity to give informed consent to consent to the termination of her pregnancy. Since the right to terminate a pregnancy stems from fundamental constitutional rights, it would be unjustified and irrational to limit the exercise of that right based on the woman's age.
The constitutional rights afforded in terms of sections 12(2)(a) and (b), 10, 14, and 27(1)(a) are afforded to "everyone", including girls under the age of eighteen, and as a result these girls are entitled to protection of their right to self-determination.
The right to have access to information
Section 32(1) of the Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right of access to any information held by the state, and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights". O'Sullivan argues that the lack of access to information concerning reproductive health will prevent women from exercising their right to reproductive decision making and will ultimately limit the control women have over their bodies. 74 In terms of section 6 of the Choice Act, medical practitioners and midwives are obliged to provide women with information concerning their rights in relation to the Act. 405 (1989) , where the Supreme Court of California held that the duty to disclose information about reproductive health issues arises from the fact that women have the right to exercise control over their bodies. This right cannot be meaningfully exercised without adequate information upon which to base a decision. In this case a rape victim was denied access to information concerning emergency contraception.
The Choice Act, under the direction of the Constitution, sketches an image of women as equal and free autonomous agents, regardless of age. Most importantly, it is submitted that the Constitution and the Choice Act draw attention to the fact that the presence of an early pregnancy is not an invitation to introduce and impose limitations on women, but serves rather as a ground for enhanced protection.
Without this protection, women may in fact be reduced to substandard citizens merely filling a reproductive role in society.
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Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act: recognising foetal interests
In 1998 provides that everyone has the right to life. It was argued that the right to life applies to a foetus from the moment of conception. An exception was raised on the grounds that there is no cause of action, since a foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights in terms of section 11, and that section 11 does not preclude the termination of a pregnancy in the circumstances contemplated by the Choice Act.
The High Court had to determine if the word "everyone" includes a foetus, because the validity of the plaintiff's action was dependent on the assertion that "everyone" applies to a foetus from the moment of conception. 75 The court stated that it was not concerned with medical or scientific evidence as to when life begins and regarding foetal development, nor was it the function of the court to decide the issue on religious or philosophical grounds; this, it held, was a legal issue that had to be decided on the basis of proper legal interpretation. The question here was not if a foetus is a human being, but rather if a foetus is afforded the same legal protection as those persons born alive.
75 Christian Lawyers 1998 1118C.
Examining the Constitution, the court held that there are no express provisions affording a foetus legal personality or protection. 76 In terms of section 12(2) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to make decisions concerning reproduction, and the court found that nowhere in the Constitution can it be said that this right is qualified in order to protect a foetus. 77 However, this does not restrict the state from enacting legislation that limits and regulates the termination of pregnancies.
78
Had the drafters of the Constitution intended to protect a foetus, the court would have expected this to have been done in terms of section 28 relating to the rights of children. 79 The court found that age begins at birth, therefore excluding a foetus from the provisions of section 28, since a foetus is not a child of any age. 80 If section 28
does not include a foetus within the ambit of its protection, then it can hardly be said that other provisions of the Bill of Rights, including section 11, were intended to protect a foetus.
81
In further validation of the conclusion reached, the court turned to other provisions in the Constitution where "everyone" is referred to and not where a specific class of persons is singled out. 82 It was demonstrated that in those cases where the term "everyone" is used, it cannot be applied to or include, a foetus in its ambit. 83 If a foetus were to be included in the interpretation of "everyone" in section 11, that action would ascribe to the term a meaning different from that which it bears everywhere else in the Bill of Rights.
84
The court stated that if section 11 were to be interpreted as affording constitutional protection to a foetus, far-reaching and inconsistent consequences would ensue. To start with, the foetus would enjoy the same protection as the pregnant woman, and this would result in termination of pregnancies being constitutionally prohibited even when the pregnancy poses serious threats to the woman's life or where there is a likelihood that the foetus will suffer from a serious mental or physical defect after birth, or when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. 86 The Choice Act sets out the circumstances and the conditions that allow for the termination of a pregnancy. Section 2(1)(a) states that a pregnancy may be terminated upon the request of a woman during the first twelve weeks of gestation.
In terms of section (2)(1)(b), from the thirteenth week up to and including the twentieth week of gestation a pregnancy may be terminated only once a woman has consulted a medical practitioner and that medical practitioner is of the opinion that continued pregnancy would pose a risk to the mother's physical or mental health;
that there is a substantial risk that the foetus will suffer from severe physical or mental abnormality; that the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest; or that the continued pregnancy will severely affect the woman's social or economic circumstances. In terms of section 2(1)(c), a pregnancy that has reached the twentyfirst week of gestation may be terminated only if a medical practitioner, after consulting with another medical practitioner, is of the opinion that the continued pregnancy will endanger the woman's life, will result in severe malformation of the foetus, or will pose a risk of injury to a foetus. It is clear that as the pregnancy progresses a woman's freedom of choice is curtailed and the decision is shared with a medical practitioner and must fall within one of the stipulated grounds.
Although Christian Lawyers 1998 set the scene of a rather grim legal framework concerning foetal interests, Christian Lawyers 2005, read together with the Choice Act, introduced a change in approach. The restrictions contained in the Choice Act reveal a legislative commitment to balancing the increasingly compelling interests of the foetus (at and after viability) with women's rights to autonomy. 
State interest in foetal life
It is accepted that a foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights, but Meyerson correctly points out that this does not finalise the matter concerning foetal interests.
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If that were the case, the state would pass laws permitting late terminations of pregnancies for any reason whatsoever right up to the moment of birth. 92 The state would also permit the creation of embryos for research purposes and license experimentation on them long past the point at which it is generally believed that such experimentation is acceptable. 93 Women could be paid to terminate their pregnancies in order to ensure a ready supply of cadaver foetal brain tissue, which is valuable in the treatment of disease.
94
There is an obstacle to treating a foetus in such an arbitrary fashion. , who states that the value of dignity can be invoked in three types of cases: where the value of dignity guides the interpretation of the right and by doing so shapes the ambit of the right; where the value of dignity can be used to justify the limitation of a right; and where the value of dignity can be used in cases where the Bill of Rights does not directly apply to the circumstances and, in this case, the value of dignity will inform the development of the common law or the interpretation of the statute (Woolman "Dignity" 36-24). [D]espite the fact that not every woman's decision will be in accordance with another's individual sense of morality, society's interest must only be an advisory one. Otherwise we will be left with the dangerous and oppressive situation of the state imposing a preconceived moral stance, which has been created in part from stereotypes of women's intellectual and physiological capabilities.
However, beyond early prenatal life, and once the foetus becomes more developed and approaches viability, its destruction at this point becomes less tied to intractably disputed views, and the weight to be afforded to human dignity in competition with female reproductive rights becomes less controversial.
113
Accepting the above arguments as constitutionally valid, a concern remains regarding the termination of pregnancies for socio-economic reasons in the second trimester. 114 The authors referred to above describe "early pregnancy" as including first-and second-trimester pregnancies. However, it is difficult to accept that a pregnancy that has developed into the second trimester can still be described as an "early pregnancy". At this point, as a pregnancy develops through the weeks of the second trimester, the foetus begins to take the form of an infant and moves indisputably closer to viability. It has been stated that, according to Myburgh, provisions that allow the termination of pregnancies for socio-economic reasons are Through the lens of foetal interests, and at first glance, the socio-economic reason provision is arbitrary. However, taking a closer contextual look into second-trimester terminations in South Africa, it is argued that this provision serves a very important role for South African women. Of the total number of pregnancies that were terminated in 2009, thirteen per cent took place in the second trimester (after twelve weeks' gestation). 117 These statistics lead one to question why second-trimester terminations are taking place (if not for therapeutic reasons) at a time when South
African legislation permits first-trimester termination of pregnancies on demand.
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Going further into the inquiry, are these decisions infused with a sense of arbitrariness and tactless conduct on the part of women seeking second-trimester termination-of-pregnancy services?
Harries et al conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-seven women terminating their second-trimester pregnancies for non-therapeutic reasons. 119 The authors found that women were accessing the health-care system in the first trimester, but that, as a result of delays, the termination procedure took place only in the second trimester. Delays experienced by women included a delay in pregnancy recognition, confirmation and response. Participants recalled signs of pregnancy, but did not initially link these symptoms to a possible pregnancy. One participant discussed how 115 Myburgh Humanity and the Protection of the Unborn 60. Van Oosten 1999 SALJ 64 also argues that the Choice Act merely grants women the freedom to terminate a pregnancy for whatever reason she considers fit since the Act simply views the foetus as a "member of the pregnant woman's body, which includes the right to have her embryo killed." Van Oosten 1999 SALJ 76 is rather critical of the Choice Act and describes it as being plagued with "lacunae, contradictions, inconsistencies and incomprehensibilities, and demonstrates a stunning ignorance of basic principles of criminal law and an inexplicable ambivalence on the issue of abortion, and a surprising insensitivity to the meaning of words on the legislature's part. she bought a home pregnancy test and, even after a positive result, waited another four weeks because she was in doubt. Women reported experiencing emotional, cultural and religious pressure and manipulation. Most women stated that they were not able to support children based on their varying personal and social circumstances: they were not ready, did not have the financial means, or wanted to continue with schooling; and one woman indicated that she was HIV-positive and had limited financial means. Emotional responses were fear, indecision and conflict.
One woman discussed the guilt she felt and stated that she knew she would be punished for her decision to terminate her pregnancy.
Harries et al further reported that some women had difficulty in accessing termination-of-pregnancy services.
120 Many women spoke of the negative and judgmental attitudes displayed by staff at public facilities, of staff who were reportedly rude or hostile, and of some staff resorting to imposing religious beliefs on pregnant women by bringing the Bible to consultations. Such an intolerant environment consequently drove women to find other clinics and, in some cases, to seek help from the private sector, which not only has a financial implication, but also causes further delay, since women first have to save the money required to pay for the termination. Women were also faced with clinics that were fully booked and were placed on a waiting list. This caused delays, since women were required to wait a further two weeks for an appointment.
In 2006 Chelsea Morroni and Jennifer Moodley conducted a study of 164 women who presented themselves for termination-of-pregnancy services in the Western Cape, eighty-two of whom were in the second trimester. 121 The authors discovered that it took an average of two-and-a-half visits to health-care facilities before initiating the termination-of-pregnancy service. The authors state that in order to decrease the proportion of second-trimester termination of pregnancies the referral pathways must be examined, requiring speedier services for women. This is an on-going problem. In 2011 Grossman et al conducted a study of surgical and medical second-trimester terminations in South Africa, which also discussed the fact that women experienced barriers when trying to access the health-care system for termination-of-pregnancy services. 122 The majority of participants reported three or more clinic or hospital visits, and substantial delays of up to thirty days occurring between the date of the first clinic visit to the date of admission for the termination services. Roughly forty per cent of women who required termination-of-pregnancy services were at twelve weeks' gestation or earlier at the time of the first visit to a clinic.
Morroni and Moodley stated that all of the women seeking second-trimester termination of pregnancy were faced with unplanned pregnancies: twenty of the eighty-two women were teenagers, just over one-quarter were self-supporting, while thirty-eight were still in school. 123 Having regard to the contextual reality that women find themselves in when looking to terminate their pregnancies, elective, secondtrimester termination of pregnancy fulfils a very crucial role in South Africa. It is not only the rights of pregnant women that are being advanced, but also the rights of those with whom they already share a relationship and have a responsibility of care towards (children and dependent family members). These women would find themselves in dire circumstances if termination-of-pregnancy legislation prohibited second-trimester terminations, especially where delays in terminations are the result of external factors linked to financial resources, staff attitudes, and poor referral systems. Although these studies were limited to termination-of-pregnancy services in the public sector, they do give an indication of the hardship that the majority of South African women face in general. It can hardly be concluded that second-trimester termination of pregnancies is generally arbitrarily and irresponsibly sought after or relied on.
It also needs to be noted that second-trimester, termination-of-pregnancy services are not rendered on demand, as with first-trimester terminations. Pregnant women are required to consult with a medical practitioner, and the medical practitioner must be of the opinion that continued pregnancy will significantly affect their social or economic circumstances. The court found that the intentional killing of a foetus does not fall within the scope of the definition of murder, as the person being killed has to have been born alive.
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The principles of legality found in section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution prevented the court from extending the definition of murder to include the killing of a foetus, and the court was not prepared to make a prospective declaration of a new or extended crime, as this task was best suited to the legislature.
135
The court reiterated that the Constitution does not bestow any fundamental rights on a foetus and that there had been no South African court that had held to the contrary. 136 However, the Constitution does protect everyone's right to bodily and psychological integrity, including the right to make reproductive decisions. Accordingly, harm to a foetus may be dealt with through the use of existing crimes against pregnant women.
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The court found that the two accused were guilty of the attempted murder of Shelver and that the aggravation of the assault, in the form of assault on the foetus, would be taken into consideration at the sentencing stage. 139 The court stated that the common law crime of assault offers sufficient protection to pregnant women; this is as a result of the "unique togetherness" shared by Shelver and the foetus.
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Even though the court did not develop the position of foetal interests in South Africa to the point that a foetus can be a murder victim, the decision does not bring this matter to an end. The court's refusal to consider the foetus a victim of murder ensured that the balance achieved between the Choice Act and the value of dignity is maintained. Had the court developed the crime of murder to include a foetus, a foetus would be granted the status of a legal subject and constitutional rights would attach to it. Female autonomy would be severely limited for the duration of a woman's pregnancy, and the termination of a pregnancy would be a violation of the foetus's right to life, even in the case where continued pregnancy would endanger the woman's life. This is an unacceptable consequence that the court rightly avoided.
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Conclusion
The Choice Act is an expression of female autonomy and gives effect to fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. At first glance there is an impression that our permissive The Choice Act is an example of how constitutional rights and values are used to achieve a balanced relationship between a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and the value of dignity. As a pregnancy progresses up to and beyond viability, the Choice Act is less permissive and more restrictive. The Choice Act also plays the role of the protector of foetal interests and partially accommodates and shelters foetal interests, as far as is constitutionally permissible. Contemplating the circumstances in which women find themselves, the provisions of the Choice Act have proven to be socially relevant.
Moving beyond the context of the Choice Act, Mshumpa is an example of the fact that the process of maintaining a state of balanced rights and interests is an ongoing exercise, and that the balance achieved by the Choice Act is relevant to all spheres of the law.
This article seeked to demonstrate the constitutional setting of women's terminationof-pregnancy rights on the one hand, and foetal interests on the other. It may be concluded that this conflicting position, rather than being deepened, is in fact balanced in South Africa, by legislation and relevant case law. 
